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ABSTRACT 
In 2007, the District of Columbia (DC) passed the Public Education Reform Amendment 
Act (PERAA), which established mayoral control of DC Public Schools (DCPS) and led to the 
appointment of Michelle Rhee as school chancellor. In an effort to boost student achievement, 
Chancellor Rhee replaced many school principals as one of her first reforms. For the 2008–2009 
school year, 39 percent of the principals in the school district—51 individuals—did not return, 
and more were replaced in the following years. We measured whether students in a school with a 
new principal performed better on standardized tests than they would have if the original 
principal had been retained. To do so, we analyzed the changes in student achievement that 
occurred when principals who left at the end of each of the school years from 2007–2008 
through 2010–2011 were replaced. We compared the achievement of students in DCPS schools 
before and after a change in school leadership, and then compared this change to the change in 
the achievement of students from a sample of comparison schools within DCPS that kept the 
same principal. We found that after three years with a new principal, the average student’s 
reading achievement increased by 4 percentile points (0.09 standard deviations) compared to 
how the student would have achieved had DCPS not replaced the previous principal. For 
students in grades 6 to 8, the gains were larger and statistically significant in both math and 
reading.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. Overview 
In 2007, the District of Columbia (DC) began a process of school reform with the Public 
Education Reform Amendment Act (PERAA). PERAA led to numerous reforms that changed 
nearly every aspect of the DC Public Schools (DCPS), including school governance structures, 
human capital policies, and leadership. PERAA placed DCPS under mayoral control; Adrian 
Fenty, the mayor of DC, used his authority to appoint Michelle Rhee as the first chancellor of 
DCPS. In an effort to boost student achievement, Chancellor Rhee replaced many school 
principals as one of her first reforms. 
Although DCPS has made annual renewal decisions about school principals prior to and 
since PERAA, Chancellor Rhee changed the implementation of the principal retention policy to 
engage in a conscious strategy of replacing poor-performing principals. For the 2008–2009 
school year, 39 percent of the principals in the school district—51 individuals—did not return. 
Less than 30 percent of principals left DCPS in any other school year between 2003–2004 and 
2010–2011. Because as many as half of the exits that occurred at the end of the 2007–2008 
school year were intentional dismissals by Rhee (Turque 2008), these circumstances provide a 
unique opportunity to understand the impact of targeted principal dismissals on student 
achievement. Whereas most previous research on the impact of principal transitions has focused 
on typical principal turnover or rotations across schools, the replacements in DCPS provide 
evidence on the effectiveness of a policy of principal dismissals. 
In this report, we measure whether students in a school with a new principal performed 
better on standardized tests than they would have if the original principal had been retained. To 
do so, we analyze the changes in student achievement that occurred when exiting DCPS 
principals were replaced. We examine principal exits that occurred at the end of each of the 
school years from 2007–2008 through 2010–2011, and in particular we examine the 2008 
replacements following the enactment of PERAA.  
The primary challenge in this analysis is to distinguish between changes in school-wide 
student achievement caused by the new principal from those that might have occurred even if the 
dismissed principal had continued to lead the school. Achievement gains could have occurred if 
other factors besides the principal also changed in DCPS schools and affected student 
achievement. For example, PERAA also led to changes in human capital policies for teachers, 
which may have affected achievement trends in all DCPS schools. To address this issue, our 
analysis uses a comparison group of DCPS schools that did not experience transitions in school 
leadership. Doing so allows us to focus on how achievement trends differ in schools with and 
without replacements. 
We implemented this strategy using a “difference-in-differences” design, so called because 
the design involves making two comparisons. The first comparison was between the 
achievement of students in DCPS schools before and after a principal’s replacement. We then 
compared this change to the change in the achievement of students from a sample of comparison 
schools within DCPS in which the principal was not replaced. In doing so, we estimated how the 
achievement of students in the schools with new principals would have performed in the absence 
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of a leadership transition. Our analysis also accounts for students’ prior achievement and 
background characteristics to address changes in the composition of students in a school over 
time. 
We also address other challenges in our analysis. For example, some of the 51 principal 
exits following the 2007–2008 school year coincided with school closures and combinations. As 
a result, changes in achievement after replacements may reflect not only the impact of the change 
in leadership, but also the impact of combining schools. In addition, we address challenges that 
arise from the possibility that the schools in our comparison sample differ importantly from 
schools with exiting principals. For example, DCPS may have selected principals for dismissal 
from schools with declining achievement trends. If so, then achievement trends in comparison 
schools may not reflect how achievement would have evolved in schools with replacements had 
DCPS not replaced any principals, and our difference-in-differences design would produce 
estimates that are confounded by the differences between the two groups of schools. 
We found that new principals led to significantly higher achievement for students in reading. 
The average student’s reading achievement in schools led by new principals increased by 
4 percentile points compared to how the student would have achieved had DCPS not replaced 
their previous principals. New principals did not have immediate impacts on achievement—we 
found statistically significant impacts on reading achievement following new principals’ third 
year—but we found no evidence that student achievement declined after replacements, even 
temporarily. Although not as strong, the pattern was similar for math. For students in grades 6 to 
8, the gains were larger and statistically significant in both subjects after two years; new 
principals improved achievement of the average 6th- to 8th-grade student by 9 percentile points 
in math and 8 percentiles in reading.  
B. Previous research  
Several previous studies have attempted to measure the contributions of principals to student 
achievement. For this review, we focus on studies that, like ours, use individual student data and 
account for students’ prior test scores and other background characteristics when measuring 
these contributions. We omit studies that focus on school-wide average achievement, because 
these studies can misattribute to a new principal a change in student achievement that is caused 
by a change in student composition.  
Most recent studies of principals’ impact on achievement do account for student 
background, and many do so by calculating school “value added.” School value added isolates 
the school’s contribution to student achievement from the contributions of factors that are 
outside the control of the school, including the background characteristics of students. In 
addition to principal effectiveness, school value added may also measure the effectiveness of 
teachers in the school, contributions of school resources and facilities to achievement, and other 
school-level factors. By comparing a school’s value added before and after a principal was 
replaced, this approach can isolate a principal’s impact on achievement from other school-level 
factors. 
Recent studies that compare a school’s value added in the years before and after a principal 
transition have found that principals account for well under half of the differences in the level of 
student achievement across schools, with other school-level factors responsible for the remaining 
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differences. Using data from Pennsylvania, Chiang et al. (2012) found that principals are 
responsible for at most 25 percent of the school’s contribution to student achievement. Results 
from studies in Miami-Dade County Public Schools (Grissom et al. 2012), and Texas 
(Branch et al. 2012) are consistent with a figure that is less than 15 percent. 1 If DCPS principals 
were responsible for 15 percent of the school’s contribution to student achievement, then 
replacing a principal who is at the 16th percentile of effectiveness with an average principal—an 
improvement of one standard deviation—would improve the average student’s achievement by 
1 percentile point.2 
Several studies have found that it may take a few years for a new principal to make full 
impact in a new school. Using data from New York City, Clark et al. (2009) found that new 
principals’ contributions to student achievement improve by approximately 0.01 standard 
deviations between the principals’ first and third year of experience. Coelli and Green (2012) 
studied principal transitions in British Columbia, Canada, and found that it may take three or 
more years for a new principal to reach full impact in a school—and this impact can be much 
larger than the average impact over the first few years.3 Two studies examined cumulative 
impacts of new principals on achievement over time. Dhuey and Smith (2013b), who also 
studied British Columbia principals, found that cumulative exposure for three years to a new 
principal who is one standard deviation more effective can boost student scores by 0.4 standard 
deviations. Gates et al. (2013) studied outcomes of students in 10 districts that recruited 
principals from New Leaders—a program designed to recruit, train, and support highly effective 
principals—and found that cumulative exposure to these principals over three years improved 
scores by approximately 0.03 standard deviations.4 
Finally, Miller (2013) suggests that too much credit may be given to new principals if they 
were hired after a drop in the school’s achievement under the previous principal. Using data from 
North Carolina, she found that although new principals improve over their first few years in a 
new school, after five years the new principal is only as effective as the previous principal’s 
highest level of performance. Miller (2013) warns against attributing all of the post-transition 
gains to the new principal. Had the original principal instead been retained, the pre-transition 
                                                 
1
 However, Dhuey and Smith (2013a), studying principals in British Columbia, found that the same principal may 
have a larger contribution to student achievement if he or she is placed in a different school where the principal is a 
better “match” for the specific challenges that school faces. Also, Branch et al. (2012) found that the impact of 
individual principals may vary more in schools with more low-income students, suggesting larger variation in match 
quality in these schools—although this finding could instead result from differences in the principals who lead these 
schools compared to schools with higher-income students.  
2
 We estimate that a DCPS school that is one standard deviation more effective improves student achievement by 
0.20 student-level standard deviations, equivalent to improving the average student’s achievement by 8 percentiles. 
If principals are responsible for 15 percent of that improvement, a principal who is one standard deviation more 
effective would contribute 0.03 standard deviations, or a 1 percentile point improvement. 
3
 Branch et al. (2012) also examine estimates of principals’ impacts on student achievement that are allowed to 
change with tenure in the school, but conclude the measures are too imprecise to be useful in their data. 
4
 Estimates in Gates et al. (2013) are not directly comparable to those in the other studies. Whereas the other studies 
presented impacts from improving principal effectiveness by one standard deviation, the New Leaders principals in 
Gates et al. (2013) may differ by more or less than one standard deviation of principal effectiveness from the 
principals they replaced. 
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drop in performance may have proven to be only temporary. Thus, some or all of the gains 
associated with the new principal might also have been achieved had no transition occurred.5  
C. Our contribution 
This study makes two contributions to the previous research. First, all principal transitions in 
DCPS were precipitated by principals who left the district, many of whom DCPS targeted for 
replacement. In contrast, previous studies have focused on rotations between schools or other 
typical nonretention. Thus, the exiting principals may be more likely to be low performers than 
in previous studies. The DCPS replacements are more likely to be new hires or promotions, 
although some replacements were transferred from other schools that closed or were combined. 
Consequently, the impact of the new DCPS principals may differ from the impact of transitions 
in previously studied states and districts. Furthermore, this is the first study to examine the 
impact of a strategy of replacing poor-performing principals similar to the one precipitated by 
PERAA in DCPS. 
Second, we provide evidence of the impact of a new principal on student achievement in 
each year up to four years following the previous principal’s exit. Similarly, we are also able to 
observe possible trends in achievement prior to the replacements, such as the declines that Miller 
(2013) warns could lead to overstating the impact of a new principal. Our eight-year panel of 
student achievement data allows us to investigate these patterns to understand whether post-
transition impacts can be fully attributed to the impact of the new principal. We are not aware of 
any previous study using longitudinal student-level data that obtains such rich information about 
the timing of student achievement impacts from new principals. 
                                                 
5
 Although Miller’s study uses school-level rather than student-level data, leaving the possibility that the impact 
estimates may be partly caused by changes in school composition and not only principal transitions, she attempts to 
address concerns related to changes in student composition that arise from using school-level data. 
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II. EMPIRICAL APPROACH 
A. Difference-in-differences design  
Our approach to measuring the impact of a new principal on student achievement is to 
compare the trend in achievement observed in schools with replacements to the same trend in 
schools that did not experience a transition in school leadership. The change in achievement 
before and after the change in school leadership is the first difference in our “difference-in-
differences” design; the second difference is between this achievement trend and the trend over 
the same time period in a set of comparison schools that kept the same principal. In doing so, we 
also account for changes in the composition of students in schools with and without new 
principals. 
In Figure II.1, we use hypothetical data to illustrate the difference-in-differences approach to 
obtaining estimates of the impact of the changes in school leadership that occurred at the end of 
the 2007–2008 school year. The horizontal axis indicates the spring of a school year so that 2008 
is the last year that an exiting principal led the school, indicated by the vertical solid red line. The 
outcome in Figure II.1 is school value added—a measure of the contribution of school-level 
factors (including but not limited to principals) to student achievement. In this hypothetical 
example, schools that kept the same principal have higher value added compared to schools with 
new principals in the 2008–2009 school year, so the solid blue line for schools that kept the same 
principals is above the dashed red line for schools with new principals. 
In the hypothetical example, the new principals led to positive impacts on achievement. The 
gap between the two trends in value added, one of the two differences in the difference-in-
differences research design, is represented by the vertical dashed black lines. These gaps are 
constant from 2006 through 2008, but narrow starting in 2009. The narrower gap in 2009 
indicates that student achievement in schools with new principals improved after one year with 
the new principal compared to student achievement in comparison schools for the same years. 
The gap remains constant after 2009, indicating that achievement gain was sustained through the 
2011–2012 school year in this hypothetical example. The change in the gap between schools 
with and without changes in school leadership encapsulates the two comparisons in our 
difference-in-differences research design. 
We use regression analysis to estimate the impacts of the new principals on achievement. 
The regressions model trends in math and reading achievement for schools with and without 
transitions. In addition to prior achievement and other characteristics of students, the regression 
accounts for differences in achievement between schools that do not change over time, such as 
those that may be caused by differences in school resources or other school-level factors. The 
regression also accounts for changes in the overall average student achievement levels over time 
and across grades that may have arisen from other district-wide changes or DCPS policies. 
Our impact estimates give the change in the gap in achievement between schools with and 
without new principals from a baseline year—the last school year the exiting principal led the 
school. We estimate the change in the gap for each of the four years following and the five years 
prior to a change in school leadership. We formally describe our regression specification in 
Appendix A. 
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Figure II.1. Hypothetical achievement trends for schools with and without 
new principals in the 2008–2009 school year 
 
Source: Hypothetical data. 
B. Limitations  
Although our study makes important contributions to understanding the impact of new 
principals on student achievement that ultimately resulted from PERAA reforms, we 
acknowledge three limitations. First, although we examine turnover that results in many cases 
from an intentional policy of attempting to replace ineffective principals with highly effective 
new principals, we cannot distinguish principals who left voluntarily from those who left DCPS 
involuntarily. Thus, we examine the impact of replacing principals who left DCPS voluntarily or 
otherwise. However, even if our data did distinguish between voluntary and involuntary exits, 
some voluntary exits may actually be more similar to involuntary exits. For example DCPS 
could offer incentives to retain highly effective principals and, in so doing, make it less likely 
that less-effective principals will return. Rather than formal performance incentives, these 
incentives could be intangible, such as more cordial relationships with DCPS leadership. This 
may have occurred for teachers in DCPS. Dee and Wyckoff (2013) found that the DCPS 
IMPACT evaluation system led more lower-performing teachers to exit the district even though 
they were not subject to dismissal under IMPACT. If DCPS provided incentives for principals to 
voluntarily exit, then estimating the impact of replacements for all exits combined may be 
preferred rather than attempting to distinguish voluntary from involuntary exits. As a 
consequence, our results provide an estimate of the impact on student achievement that DCPS 
achieved from replacements that occurred as a result of targeted dismissals combined with the 
impact of more typical nonretention. 
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Second, our estimates of the impact of new principals could be confounded with other 
changes over time within schools that are not caused by the exits.6 Although we account for 
changes in the composition of students within schools, DCPS may have implemented other 
changes in schools at the same time they were replacing principals. Our analysis accounts for 
these changes if they have the same impact on achievement in schools with and without new 
principals. However, some changes may have differentially affected achievement in these 
groups. Most notably, DCPS closed or combined many schools, with some of these school 
closings and combinations occurring simultaneously with the changes in school leadership. 
Although we conduct analyses to address simultaneous school closures and exits, changes to 
school resources that coincided with a change in school leadership may have also occurred and 
are more difficult to measure. For example, DCPS may have provided new principals with 
additional resources to support the transition. If so, our impact estimates would be too large, as 
they would conflate the impact of the new principal with the impact of the additional resources. 
Finally, our approach to estimating the impact of new principals requires that schools in the 
comparison group are unaffected by the policy of selectively replacing principals, but this may 
not be the case. Some new principals were drawn from comparison schools that were closed or 
combined. Movement of students out of closed comparison schools will necessarily lead to 
changes in the composition of students in other comparison and treatment schools. To help 
address concerns that the composition of students in comparison schools may change over time, 
we account for student background characteristics when measuring trends in the contributions of 
comparison school principals, just as we do for schools with changes in school leadership. 
However, there may be other ways in which comparison schools are affected by this human 
capital policy that we cannot address. For example, the threat of dismissals in DCPS may have 
incentivized principals to bring about higher achievement in their schools. If so, principals in 
comparison schools may have been retained in part because they responded to those incentives 
by improving student achievement. In this case, our impact estimates would be lower than they 
would be in the absence of any incentives. Alternatively, if the incentives affected both groups of 
principals similarly, our impact estimates would reflect only the effects of replacing principals 
and not the full impact of the policy including incentive effects. Consequently, the full impact of 
the principal dismissal strategy could be larger than our estimates suggest. 
                                                 
6
 In other words, our difference-in-differences strategy requires that we assume that any unobserved determinants of 
student achievement that vary across schools do not also vary over time in a way that is related to whether schools 
did or did not have a principal replaced. 
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III. DATA 
We use administrative data provided by DCPS and the Office of the State Superintendent of 
Education of DC (OSSE). The data include (1) a list of DCPS principals’ school assignments for 
each school year from 2000–2001 through 2011–2012, (2) student background characteristics 
including math and reading test scores in grades 3 through 8 and 10 for the 2002–2003 through 
2011–2012 school years, and (3) information on students’ school enrollment. Although our main 
analysis focuses on student outcomes in the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–
2012, we use data from 2000–2001 through 2004–2005 to construct a measure of principal 
experience, and in some sensitivity analyses. 
Our analysis divides schools into those in which DCPS replaced principals and those in 
which it did not between the 2007–2008 and 2010–2011 school years. The percentage of 
principals who left DCPS varied substantially over time, and some principals were forced out of 
jobs due to school combinations or closings. The annual turnover rate of DCPS principals varied 
between 14 to 39 percent from 2003–2004 through 2010–2011 (last row of Table III.1). The 
largest percentage of principals leaving DCPS occurred at the end of the 2007–2008 school year, 
Michelle Rhee’s first year as chancellor, when 39 percent of principals—51 individuals—did not 
return to DCPS.  
School restructuring in DCPS creates challenges for tracking student achievement over time 
in schools with and without changes in school leadership. For example, schools that closed do 
not have new principals. In most cases, the school of a departing principal remained open; 
however, as shown in rows 2 and 3 of Table III.1, these schools were sometimes closed or 
combined. The principal exits from 2007–2008 coincided with substantial restructuring of the 
schools; nine of the schools with a departing principal combined with another school, and nine 
other schools with departing principals closed. The next rows of Table III.1 show that school 
closures and combinations also affected some returning principals. Again taking the 2007–2008 
school year as an example, the principals in six schools that closed transferred to a different 
school in DCPS and three principals continued leading their school after it was combined with 
one of the nine combined schools led by a departing principal.7 
We measure the impacts of replacing principals in DCPS using student test scores in math 
and reading. The test scores are from SAT-9 tests from spring 2003 through spring 2005 and 
DC Comprehensive Assessment System (DC CAS) in spring of the subsequent seven years. We 
standardized the test scores to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of one within each 
combination of grade, year, and subject. This step translated math and reading test scores in 
every grade and year into a common metric; the DC CAS scores otherwise would not be 
comparable across these groups (that is, they are not “vertically aligned”). Standardizing the 
scores means that we cannot track DC-wide changes in achievement levels over time; however, 
                                                 
7
 The 12 principals in the 2007–2008 schools that were combined were involved in six combinations of two schools 
each, so that these 12 schools were led by six of the principals in the 2008–2009 school year. 
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that is not a goal of our analyses. Instead, we compare trends in achievement between students in 
schools with and without principal transitions.8  
Table III.1. Principal transitions in DCPS by school year and status 
Principal and school 
status 
2003–
2004 
2004–
2005 
2005–
2006 
2006–
2007 
2007–
2008 
2008–
2009 
2009–
2010 
2010–
2011 
Left DCPS         
School remained open 17 32 24 18 33 22 29 21 
School combined 0 0 1 0 9 0 0 0 
School closed 0 0 1 0 9 2 1 1 
Stayed in DCPS         
School remained open 102 87 95 112 71 85 77 84 
School combined 0 0 1 2 3 0 0 0 
School closed 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 
Total 119 119 122 132 131 109 107 106 
Left DCPS (%) 14 27 21 14 39 22 28 21 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes principals in schools with at least 50 tested students in grades 4 through 8 or in 
grade 10. 
 The table describes transitions that occurred at the end of each school year. 
Because of concerns with the accuracy and completeness of the SAT-9 test scores, we did 
not use these scores as outcomes for our main analyses. For analysis that did include the 
SAT-9 test scores, we excluded scores from grades 4, 6, and 7 in the 2004–2005 school year 
because we obtained relatively few test scores for students in those grades. Because we account 
for pre-test scores from the previous year in our analysis, excluding these SAT-9 scores also 
meant that we excluded all students in grades 5, 7, and 8 in the 2005–2006 school year from our 
analysis. 
To account for student background, we used indicators for race/ethnicity categories, 
subsidized meals eligibility, English language learner status, receipt of special education 
services, gender, and whether a student transferred between schools during the year. Individual 
student data on subsidized meals eligibility is lacking for students attending a community-
eligible school because these schools do not collect annual information about individual student 
poverty status.9 Beginning in the 2005–2006 school year, for students who attended community-
                                                 
8
 In standardizing across years, we also assumed that the dispersion in student ability is the same in each year. This 
would not be the case if the reforms following PERAA had a larger impact on the achievement of low-performing 
compared to high-performing students so that the gap in achievement between these two groups of students 
narrowed. Although we cannot rule out this possibility, in a sensitivity analysis we examine impacts for lower- and 
higher-achieving students separately.  
9
 Schools are eligible to become community eligible if they have a student population composed of at least 
40 percent with an identified need for free lunch based on direct certification, where students qualify based on their 
families’ participation in state welfare or food stamp programs. These schools provide free breakfasts and lunches to 
all enrolled students and save on administrative costs by forgoing the collection of individual student subsidized 
meals applications. 
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eligible schools, we used a subsidized meals status for the student from another school or year, 
when available, and otherwise marked students in those schools as eligible for free lunch. We 
marked 3.5 percent of students in these years as eligible for free lunch for this reason.  
We make several restrictions to the students and schools included in the analysis. We 
include in our main analysis students in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 
2011–2012 who are linked to at least one DCPS school for which we have identified a principal 
in the year. We also require that students have both a post-test and a pre-test from the same 
subject. For students in grades 4 through 8, the pre-test was from the previous grade and year. 
For students in grade 10, the pre-test was from grade 8 two years prior to the post-test. We then 
excluded 12 schools with new principals and 6 schools without changes in school leadership 
because of possibly compromised test scores in those schools. These schools were identified in a 
USA Today report as ones where at least half of tested classrooms showed evidence of cheating 
in at least one of the 2007–2008, 2008–2009, or 2009–2010 school years. Tests were flagged by 
the DC test score publisher if they had high rates of incorrect answers that were erased and 
replaced with correct answers (USA Today 2011).10 As a final step, we excluded schools that 
were missing from any of the seven years in the panel.11,12,13 Although we include closed schools 
in some of our analyses, this restriction to our primary analysis sample removes all 20 schools 
that closed before the 2011–2012 school year. The final analysis sample retains 88 percent of 
students who have post-tests from one or more of the seven school years. 
Our analysis focuses on the principals who left DCPS in the years following the enactment 
of the PERAA school reform legislation and their replacements. In Table III.2, we provide 
counts of the new principals included in our analysis in each of the three school years following 
PERAA and identify whether the new principals had previously led a DCPS school. Of the 
32 new principals who replaced a 2007–2008 principal, 23 were not leading a DCPS school in 
the previous year. The remaining nine new principals either led a different DCPS school during 
the 2007–2008 school year or their previous school was combined with an exiting principal’s 
school. Prior to assuming leadership of a school, new principals may have been teaching or in 
administration within DCPS, or may have been recruited from outside DCPS. The counts of new 
principals in the last row of Table III.2 are lower than the total number of transitions in Table 
III.1 because of the restrictions we made to the analysis sample and because some schools have 
had multiple post-PERAA changes in school leadership but are counted only once in Table III.2. 
For the 21 schools with multiple transitions, we include only the first new principal following 
PERAA. In doing so, we treat the subsequent replacements as a consequence of the first post-
PERAA replacement. 
                                                 
10
 We present results that instead include these 18 schools with compromised test scores in Appendix E. 
11
 For a sensitivity analysis, we also included students in the previous two school years for a nine-year panel. The 
nine-year panel excludes grade 10 because we do not have test scores from the 2001–2002 school year. 
12
 For this step, we treated two schools that were combined at some point into a single school as having been the 
same school in all years to avoid excluding these schools from the analysis. 
13
 Prior to restricting to the seven-year panel, we excluded from our analysis school-year combinations with fewer 
than 50 remaining students in any grade and subject. 
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Table III.2. New principals after PERAA by school year and status 
 Last school year departing principal led school 
New principal status 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
New principal is:     
Not previously a DCPS principal  23 9 8 3 
From another DCPS school 9 0 1 0 
New principals in analysis sample 32 9 9 3 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–
2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same 
school before and after they combined, so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed prior to 
the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Counts of new principals include only the first replacement year for the 21 schools with multiple post-
PERAA replacements. Of the 32 schools with replacements for departing principals from the 2007–2008 
school year, 17 have had at least one subsequent replacement.  
 One new principal from the 2010–2011 school year began leading two schools, so there are 53 new 
principals in our analysis but the total number of schools with new principals is 54. 
The schools in our analysis sample have slightly higher average achievement compared to 
the averages for DCPS schools generally. Table III.3 provides averages and standard deviations 
of school characteristics. The average levels of student achievement in the analysis sample can 
be different from zero because we standardized test scores using all students with test scores, not 
only those used in our analysis. Schools in our analysis sample have slightly higher achievement 
than average by 0.04 standard deviations in math and reading, shown on rows 1 and 2.  
Although students in included schools have slightly higher test scores than students in 
schools overall, the included schools were no more effective at raising student achievement than 
excluded schools. To measure school effectiveness, we used value added to student achievement, 
a measure of the contribution of school-level factors that includes but is not limited to 
principals.14 The average math and reading value-added estimates for schools in DCPS is zero by 
definition. Thus, rows 3 and 4 of Table III.3 indicate that that the schools included in the analysis 
sample are representative of the average value added of all schools in DCPS. Finally, rows 
5 though 9 of Table III.3 show average student characteristics. For example, in the average 
school, 68 percent of students in the sample are eligible for free or reduced-price lunch and 
80 percent are black. 
Compared to principals who did not leave, those who left DCPS at the end of the 2007–2008 
school year had lower-achieving students in math and reading in the year of the exit and had 
lower school value-added estimates, indicating that, on balance, the schools in which principals 
exited (voluntarily or otherwise) were not as effective at raising student achievement as schools 
                                                 
14
 We use school value added for these descriptive statistics and for a preliminary examination of the impact of 
replacing principals on student achievement, but our main analysis is conducted using student-level achievement 
data. Results based on the school value-added estimates are similar. We estimated value added for schools in each 
school year using data on student test scores and background. We describe our approach to estimating value added 
in Appendix B. 
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in which principals were retained. Additionally, returning principals led schools with fewer 
students who were eligible for free or reduced-price lunch compared to exiting principals. Other 
characteristics of principals’ students did not significantly differ for principals returning versus 
exiting after the 2007–2008 school year, and principals who left did not have significantly more 
or less experience leading schools in DCPS compared to returning principals. When pooling the 
2008–2009, 2009–2010, and 2010–2011 school years, we found no statistically significant 
differences between student characteristics in schools with principals returning versus exiting 
after these years, but exiting principals were less likely to have two to five years of experience. 
We present these differences in Table III.4. 
Table III.3. Characteristics of DCPS schools 
 School characteristic Average 
Standard 
deviation 
(1) Average math achievement (standard deviations of student achievement) 0.04 0.52 
(2) Average reading achievement (standard deviations of student 
achievement) 
0.04 0.50 
(3) Math value added (standard deviations of student achievement) 0.00 0.21 
(4) Reading value added (standard deviations of student achievement) 0.00 0.18 
(5) Fraction of students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch 0.68 0.25 
(6) Fraction of students that are English language learners 0.08 0.14 
(7) Fraction of students that receive special education services 0.17 0.08 
(8) Fraction of students that are black 0.80 0.27 
(9) Fraction of students that are Hispanic 0.11 0.18 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–
2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same 
school before and after they combined, so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed prior to 
the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Averages and standard deviations were calculated with one observation per school-year combination and 
are not weighted. 
 Math and reading achievement is standardized to have an average of zero and a standard deviation of one 
within each grade, year, and subject among all DCPS students. Value added is measured in student-level 
standard deviations of math or reading achievement and has an average of zero within each year and 
subject among all DCPS schools. 
 The table treats schools that are combined as distinct schools prior to being combined, and as a single 
school after being combined. The sample includes 82 schools, of which 12 were involved in six 
combinations. The averages include a total of 543 school-year records from the seven school years. 
Although the schools with returning principals—the 22 comparison schools in the 
analysis—are lower achieving compared to schools with new principals, this is not necessarily a 
concern. The difference-in-differences research design accounts for differences in average 
characteristics between the two groups of schools so long as a key assumption holds. We assume 
that the difference in achievement between schools with and without new principals before the 
replacements occur would be the same as the difference in the years following the replacements 
in the hypothetical case that no replacements actually occurred. In other words, we allow a pre-
transition gap in achievement between schools with and without new principals as in Figure II.1, 
but we assume that the trend in schools without new principals represents how achievement 
would have evolved in schools with changes in school leadership had DCPS not replaced any 
principals. As with similar assumptions for all research designs that rely on non-experimental 
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methods, this assumption is not directly testable because we do not observe the hypothetical case 
of no changes in school leadership. However, we provide some important evidence in support of 
this assumption by testing for differences in achievement trends in the two groups of schools 
prior to the changes in school leadership. 
Table III.4. Average characteristics of returning and exiting principals by 
time period 
 
Principals from 
2007–2008  
Principals from 
2008–2009 through 
2010–2011 
School or principal characteristic Returning Exiting  Returning Exiting 
Average achievement (standard deviations of 
student achievement) 
    
Math  0.31 -0.12* 0.22 0.02 
Reading 0.28 -0.12* 0.17 0.05 
Value added (standard deviations of student 
achievement) 
    
Math 0.08 -0.04* 0.06 -0.04 
Reading 0.07 -0.06* 0.02 -0.01 
Experience leading a DCPS school     
One year 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.09 
Two to five years 0.55 0.56 0.56 0.23* 
Six or more years 0.27 0.25 0.42 0.68 
Fraction of students who are:     
Eligible for free or reduced-price lunch 0.58 0.71* 0.66 0.67 
English-language learners 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 
Special education  0.14 0.18 0.15 0.16 
Black 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.79 
Hispanic 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.09 
Number of schools 22 32 22 22 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–
2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same 
school before and after they combined, so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed prior to 
the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Averages and standard deviations were calculated with one observation per school-year combination and 
are not weighted. 
 Math and reading achievement is standardized to have an average of zero and a standard deviation of one 
within each grade, year, and subject among all DCPS students. Value added is measured in student-level 
standard deviations of math or reading achievement and has an average of zero within each year and 
subject among all DCPS schools. 
 Principals in schools with multiple replacements between the 2007–2008 and 2010–2011 school years are 
only counted as exiting for the first of these replacements, and are not included in the averages in the 
subsequent years. Returning principals include only principals who were not replaced between the 2007–
2008 and 2010–2011 school years. 
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. Preliminary examination of trends in student achievement 
To implement our difference-in-differences research design, we analyze changes in the gap 
in student achievement between schools with and without new principals. We illustrate this 
approach using the changes in school leadership that occurred at the end of the 2007–2008 
school year. Figure IV.1 plots the average math value added in schools with and without new 
principals, and Figure IV.2 plots the same for reading. The vertical solid red line at 2008 
indicates the year in which changes in leadership occurred for schools with new principals; value 
added in this year is the schools’ contribution in the last year of the exiting principals’ tenure. 
The solid blue line for schools that kept the same principals is above the dashed red line for 
schools with new principals because schools without changes in leadership tend to have higher 
value added (Table III.4). An increase in value added for one group of schools may not reflect an 
actual year-to-year increase in the math skills of students because we standardized the value-
added estimates within each year. Consequently, we focus on the gap between the two groups, 
rather than the trend for either group alone. The gap is represented by the vertical dashed black 
lines.15 As in the hypothetical example in Figure II.1, the change in the gap between schools with 
and without transitions encapsulates the two comparisons in our “difference-in-differences” 
research design. 
The pre-transition gaps in Figures IV.1 and IV.2 support a key assumption underlying the 
difference-and-differences research design—that outcomes for the two groups of schools would 
have trended similarly had DCPS not replaced any principals. This assumption cannot be tested 
directly because we cannot know how the trend in value added for schools with new principals 
would have evolved had the original principal remained in the school. However, differences in 
the trends before the transition—such as a widening or narrowing of the gap leading up to the 
transition—would be evidence that trends for the two groups of schools would also have 
appeared different after 2008 had DCPS not replaced any principals. Although the pre-transition 
trends are not perfectly parallel leading up to 2008 (as they are for the hypothetical data in 
Figure II.1), there is no evidence of a systematic widening or narrowing of the gaps in math or 
reading. For example, the gap in math widens between 2006 and 2007, but narrows between 
2007 and 2008 (Figure IV.1).  
The figures also provide evidence that schools with new principals in the 2008–2009 school 
year improved relative to comparison schools. Between 2008 and 2012 (the four years following 
the change in school leadership), the gap between schools led by new principals and comparison 
schools narrowed for both math and reading value added. For the main results, we use regression 
analysis to estimate the size of the gaps in each year relative to the gap in the year of the 
transition, and pool estimates of the impact of changes in school leadership from 2007–2008 
through 2010–2011. 
                                                 
15
 We plot value added in this figure rather than achievement because value-added estimates account for student 
background characteristics similarly to the approach we use in our analysis. Replacing value-added estimates with 
average achievement in this figure leads to larger gaps between the two groups of schools, but the patterns are 
otherwise similar. 
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Figure IV.1. Trends in math value added for schools with and without new 
principals 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The figure includes 54 schools, of which 32 had new principals in the 2008–2009 school year. The 
figure includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 
2011–2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are 
treated as the same school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. 
Schools that closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
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Figure IV.2. Trends in reading value added for schools with and without 
new principals 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The figure includes 54 schools, of which 32 had new principals in the 2008–2009 school year. The 
figure includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 
2011–2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are 
treated as the same school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. 
Schools that closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
B. Impact of post-PERAA new principals  
1. Impact on math and reading achievement 
New principals produced higher reading achievement after three years in the school 
compared to the level of achievement prior to the change in school leadership. We found positive 
but insignificant impacts on math achievement. Figure IV.3 shows the estimate of impacts on 
math achievement for replacements that occurred between the 2007–2008 and 2011–2012 school 
years. All impact estimates in the figure are measured as changes in the gap in math achievement 
between schools with and without replacements from the gap that was present during the year of 
the replacement. This baseline gap in achievement is shown as a single dot at 0.0 standard 
deviations in the final school year before the transition occurred (called “year 0”). We measure 
changes in the gap using student-level standard deviations of student achievement. The gap in 
the year immediately following the replacement (year 1) is nearly identical to the baseline gap, 
indicating that new principals had no impact on math achievement after one year. However, the 
point estimate is larger in year 2, indicating that math achievement in schools with new 
principals improved relative to schools that kept the same principal after two years with the new 
principal. This positive impact in year 2 of 0.05 standard deviations is not statistically significant 
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(the confidence interval crosses the dashed line at 0.0). Although also not statistically significant 
in years 3 and 4, the impact estimate is 0.07 standard deviations in both of these years, 
suggesting that a higher level of achievement may have been sustained in these schools through 
the fourth year with the new principal. An impact of 0.07 standard deviations is equivalent to 
improving the average student’s performance by 3 percentiles. 
Figure IV.4 shows the same impact estimates for reading. As with math, we find no impact 
of the new principals on reading achievement in the first two years after a change in school 
leadership. The impact on reading achievement is 0.09 standard deviations in year 3 and 
0.10 standard deviations in year 4, and both estimates are statistically significant.16 An impact of 
0.10 standard deviations is equivalent to improving the average student’s performance by 
4 percentiles. The impact estimates for math and reading are also shown in Table IV.1. 
Impacts of 0.07 to 0.10 standard deviations of student-level achievement are equivalent to an 
increase in student achievement of between 3 and 4 percentiles for an average student. Impacts 
of this magnitude are consistent with new principals who are about two to three standard 
deviations more effective than the principals they replaced (Chiang et al. 2012; Grissom et al. 
2012; Branch et al. 2012).17 Gains of these magnitudes would be expected when replacing a 
principal in the bottom 5 percent of the distribution of DCPS principals with one who is in the 
middle of the distribution. Furthermore, the improvement in reading was large enough to have 
increased the proficiency rate in affected schools during the 2006–2007 school year from 36 to 
43 percent.18 
2. Pre-transition gaps in achievement 
We do not find strong evidence of pre-transition gaps in achievement between schools with 
and without replacements, suggesting that our analysis is adequately accounting for the selection 
of principals for replacements. None of the pre-transition impacts in math or reading are 
statistically significant—the confidence intervals for pre-transition years in Figures IV.3 and 
IV.4 all overlap 0.0. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the achievement of students at 
schools with new principals compared to students in comparison schools declined steadily 
leading up to the transitions, in contrast to Miller’s (2013) findings for principal transitions in 
North Carolina. The gap is nearly identical in the year immediately prior to the dismissal 
compared to the baseline gap. Although the “impacts” on achievement in the second and third 
year prior to the transitions are larger than those in the subsequent years (but not statistically 
                                                 
16
 Because we observe outcomes only through the 2011–2012 school year, the year 4 impact estimates are based 
only on principal replacements from the 2007–2008 school year. In Appendix C, we show that impact estimates only 
for this first cohort of replacement principals are slightly larger than those based on all principals. Thus, the year 4 
estimate may slightly overstate the impact of the later three cohorts of new principals. 
17
 For this calculation, we assume principals are responsible for 15 percent of schools’ contributions to student 
achievement, and that a one standard deviation improvement in school effectiveness leads to an improvement in 
student achievement of 0.20 student-level standard deviations.  
18
 For this calculation, we applied the impact of new principals in the third year after the replacements to the 2007 
test scores of students who were enrolled in the schools with post-PERAA new principals during the 2006–2007 
school year. We obtained the proficiency levels for each grade and subject from technical documentation of the 
2007 DC CAS (CTB/McGraw Hill 2008). 
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significantly so), these are not part of an overall trend downward; the point estimates in the 
earlier pre-transition years are lower. Even so, because the pre-intervention impacts are 
imprecise, it is possible that achievement declined in schools leading up to a change in school 
leadership, so we consider the possibility that principals who were replaced were simply unlucky 
in riding a downward trend in test scores in the years leading up to their departure. In a 
conservative analysis to account for this possibility, impact estimates after three and four years 
with the new principal are reduced to 1 to 3 percentiles for an average student and are not 
statistically significant. See Appendix D for the results of this analysis. 
Figure IV.3. Impact of new principals on math achievement by year 
relative to replacement 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Notes: The figure includes 76 schools, of which 54 had post-PERAA new principals. The figure includes 
schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–2012, but 
excludes 18 schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the 
same school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. Schools that 
closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their 
schools. Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the school-year level.  
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Figure IV.4. Impact of new principals on reading achievement by year 
relative to replacement 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Notes: The figure includes 76 schools, of which 54 had post-PERAA new principals. The figure includes 
schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–2012, but 
excludes 18 schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the 
same school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. Schools that 
closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their 
schools. Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the school-year level.  
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Table IV.1. Impact of new principals on math and reading achievement 
 
Impact by year since replacement 
(standard deviations of student achievement) 
Subject Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Math 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading 0.01 0.05 0.09* 0.10* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes 76 schools, of which 54 had post-PERAA new principals. The table includes schools 
observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–2012, but excludes 18 schools 
where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same school before and after 
they combined so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed prior to the 2011–2012 school 
year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their schools. 
Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level.  
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
C. Impact of new principals for subgroups of students and schools 
We also estimate the impact of new principals for subgroups of students and schools, 
including for grade spans, higher- and lower-achieving students, and more- and less-experienced 
principals. Impacts could be larger for students in higher grades if discipline and school culture 
policies allow principals more influence on student achievement in those grades. Results for 
lower-achieving students could be larger if these students are more sensitive to changes in 
leadership. Principals with less experience may be less effective, which would lead to larger 
impact estimates for that subgroup. However, there are many reasons besides these that results 
could differ between these subgroups. Furthermore, because of the number of subgroups we 
examine, it is possible that we might obtain different results for one or more subgroups based 
only on chance. Consequently, the differences should only be considered suggestive of which 
groups might benefit more from new principals. Furthermore, none of the differences in impact 
estimates between these groups are statistically significant. 
1. Results by grade span 
We found larger impacts of new principals for students in grades 6 to 8, compared to 
students in grades 4 and 5.19 In the third year after a replacement—the first year in which we 
found significant impacts for the full sample—we found no impact on math achievement for 
students in grades 4 or 5 in math and a statistically insignificant impact of 0.06 standard 
deviations in reading (Panel A of Table IV.2). For students in grades 6 to 8, the impact after 
three years with the new principal was 0.24 standard deviations in math and 0.19 standard 
deviations in reading (Panel B of Table IV.2). These impacts for students in grades 6 to 8 are 
equivalent to an increase in student achievement of between 8 and 9 percentiles for an average 
                                                 
19
 Although we include grade 10 in the full sample results, we do not report separate results for grade 10 because 
they were very imprecise; only 11 schools had grade 10 students. 
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student. The improvements after three years were large enough to have increased the proficiency 
rate in affected middle schools during the 2006–2007 school year from 36 to 47 percent in 
reading, and from 28 to 42 percent in math. 
2. Results for higher- and lower-achieving students 
We did not find strong evidence that the impact of new principals differed for higher- and 
lower-achieving students. We define higher-achieving students as those who scored above the 
district-wide average score within a grade and year, and lower-achieving students as those who 
scored below that same average. The impact three years after a replacement for higher-achieving 
students was 0.07 standard deviations for math and 0.08 for reading (Panel C of Table IV.2). For 
lower-achieving students, these impacts after three years with a new principal were 0.08 standard 
deviations for math and 0.12 for reading (Panel D of Table IV.2). For both groups, the estimate 
was statistically significant for reading but not for math.  
3. Results for principals with more and less experience 
Finally, we estimated the impact of replacing more- and less-experienced principals. We 
define less-experienced principals as those with three or fewer years of experience leading 
schools in DCPS at the time that they were replaced.20 By this definition, schools with less-
experienced principals recently experienced a previous transition. Consequently, a higher impact 
of replacing a less-experienced principal compared to a more-experienced principal could result 
from the less-experienced principal having been less effective, from lower achievement in the 
school as a result of a recent transition in leadership, or from both. Our analysis cannot 
distinguish these possibilities. 
Three years after a replacement, we found larger impact estimates from replacing the less-
experienced principals, although the differences are not statistically significant. The impact 
three years after a replacement for less-experienced principals was 0.12 standard deviations for 
math and 0.14 for reading (Panel E of Table IV.2). For more-experienced principals, this year 3 
impact was a statistically insignificant 0.05 standard deviations for both math and reading 
(Panel F of Table IV.2). However, four years after a replacement, the impacts were more similar 
for the two principal experience subgroups. 
  
                                                 
20
 We limited the sample of schools with replacements to those with more- or less-experienced principals, but did 
not similarly limit the sample of comparison schools. Doing so was necessary to obtain precise results. 
Consequently, the comparison group of schools for both principal experience subgroups includes the same 
22 schools. 
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Table IV.2. Impact of new principals on math and reading achievement by 
subgroup  
 
Impact by year since replacement 
(standard deviations of student achievement) 
Subject Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Panel A: Grades 4 and 5 (41 schools with new principals, 17 comparison schools) 
Math 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) 
Reading 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.09* 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Panel B: Grades 6 to 8 (45 schools with new principals, 13 comparison schools) 
Math 0.04 0.14* 0.24* 0.22* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
Reading -0.01 0.10* 0.19* 0.19* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) 
Panel C: Higher-achieving students (54 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.10* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Reading 0.00 0.02 0.08* 0.08* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel D: Lower-achieving students (54 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Reading 0.03 0.10* 0.12* 0.13* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Panel E: Three or fewer years of experience in DCPS (20 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.09 0.12* 0.12* 0.11 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
Reading 0.08* 0.11* 0.14* 0.13* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Panel F: More than four years of experience in DCPS (34 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.06 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Reading -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes only schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 
2011–2012, but excludes 18 schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as 
the same school before and after they combined, so they can be included in this sample. Schools that 
closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their schools. 
Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level.  
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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D. Accounting for school closures and combinations 
Some principal transitions coincided with school restructuring, especially in the 2007–2008 
school year, when 12 principals were in schools that were combined the following year 
(Table III.1). In addition, 15 schools closed in that same school year, and 4 more closed over the 
next three years. Our main analysis above includes combined schools but excludes the 19 closed 
schools. 
School restructuring could have an impact on student achievement besides through a 
principal. For example, Ozek et al. (2012) show that school closures in DC led to a temporary 
decline in achievement for affected students. If so, then the impact of new principals could be 
confounded with the impact of restructuring. To address this concern, we also examined results 
that exclude combined schools, and results that include closed schools. 
1. Results when excluding schools that combined 
Impacts based on our main analysis measure the combined effect of school combinations 
and transitions when they occurred simultaneously. This could understate the impact of the 
policy of replacing principals if principals in newly combined schools faced extra challenges 
improving student achievement that we did not account for. To understand whether school 
combinations affect our results, we conducted a sensitivity analysis excluding six schools with 
simultaneous combinations and transitions, all from the 2007–2008 school year.21  
Compared to our main results, impact estimates from the sensitivity analysis that excludes 
combined schools are identical three years after the replacements, and slightly larger after four 
years. Our main results indicated a 0.07 standard deviation impact on math achievement by year 
4 and a 0.10 standard deviation impact in reading (Panel A of Table IV.3). The alternative results 
show year 4 impacts of 0.10 standard deviations in math and 0.11 standard deviations in reading 
when excluding combined schools (Panel B of Table IV.3).  
2. Results when including schools that closed 
Because simultaneous school closures and principal exits were part of the strategy employed 
by DCPS after PERAA, we also conducted analysis that attributed outcomes for students who 
previously attended closed schools to the closed school after it closed. In effect, we considered 
principals in schools that students enrolled in after their school closed as replacements for the 
principal of the closed school who exited DCPS. In contrast, our main analysis attributed 
outcomes for these students to their new school. We excluded schools that closed from our main 
analysis to prevent our results from fluctuating based on changes in the composition of schools 
included in our analysis across years. 
                                                 
21
 For this sensitivity analysis we count distinct schools prior to their being combined, so the 6 schools we excluded 
were combined into 3 distinct schools for the 2008–2009 school year. Of the 12 2007–2008 schools that were 
combined into 6 distinct schools, 9 had simultaneous combinations and replacements (Table III.1). We excluded 
only 6 of these 9 schools from the sensitivity analysis, because 3 had already been excluded from our main analysis 
sample for other reasons. Similarly, we had also previously excluded the 3 2007–2008 schools that were combined 
with another school but were led by principals that were not replaced. 
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In the sensitivity analysis, we included schools that closed by tracking the achievement of 
students who attended these schools and treating these students as if they were still attending the 
closed school. In practice, this meant that approximately 900 students in seven comparison group 
schools from our main analysis were “moved” to closed schools with new principals for the 
sensitivity analysis.22 Therefore the number of schools with new principals in this sensitivity 
analysis increased to 61 from 54. For example, for grade 4 students in a school that closed at the 
end of the 2007–2008 school year, we would include their grade 5 through 8 achievement in the 
subsequent four years in the analysis, linked to the closed school. Doing so was not possible for 
all students in closed schools because we required that some students from the schools be 
observed in all seven years used in the analysis. For example, for schools that closed at the end 
of the 2007–2008 school year, this was only possible for students in grades 4. Grade 5 students 
in the 2007–2008 school year would have been in grade 9 during the 2011–2012 school year, and 
we did not observe grade 9 achievement. 
Considering schools that closed as additional schools with new principals could lead to 
lower impact estimates, if student achievement is negatively affected when students transfer to a 
new school after their previous school closes; however, we do not find that this is the case. 
Impact estimates from analysis that excludes combined schools are nearly identical to those from 
our main analysis that included closed schools (Panel C of Table IV.3). The negligible role of 
including closed schools could be due to the relatively small number of additional students who 
are included in the sensitivity analysis—the 900 new students represent a 3.5 percent increase in 
the number of students in schools with new principals. 
  
                                                 
22
 Although some school closures occurred in schools without replacements (that is, the schools closed but the 
principal stayed in DCPS to lead a new school), most were in schools that had transitions (Table III.1). The number 
of comparison group schools in the sensitivity analysis for closed schools remains 22 because for no closed 
comparison group school did we observe students who previously attended that school in each school year through 
2011–2012. 
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Table IV.3. Impact of new principals on math and reading achievement 
including or excluding schools that combined or closed 
 
Impact by year since replacement 
(standard deviations of student achievement) 
Subject Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Panel A: Main results including schools that combined and excluding closed schools (54 schools with new principals, 
22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading 0.01 0.05 0.09* 0.10* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel B: Excluding schools that combined (48 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.10* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Reading 0.00 0.04 0.09* 0.11* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel C: Including closed schools (61 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading 0.01 0.05* 0.09* 0.10* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The table includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–
2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. In the case of closed schools, students from the 
school must have been tested in each of these school years. Schools that combined are treated as the 
same school before and after they combined, so they can be included in this sample. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their schools. 
Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level.  
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Our analysis suggests that the DCPS principal replacement strategy led to higher reading 
achievement in schools and positive but statistically insignificant impacts in math. We followed 
schools with new principals for at most four years. We found that in the first year, new principals 
had no impact on achievement. Statistically significant achievement gains began in the third year 
the new principal led the school. The gains persisted through the fourth year with the new 
principal, the last year for which we were able to estimate impacts. The impact estimates are 
consistent with new principals that are two to three standard deviations more effective compared 
to the principals they replaced, or an increase in student achievement of 3 to 4 percentiles for an 
average student. The gains for students in grades 6 to 8 were consistent with an increase in 
student achievement of between 8 and 9 percentiles for an average student.  
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REGRESSION MODEL 
We estimated the following regression of students’ post-test scores on student background 
characteristics and variables that identify achievement trends for schools with new principals and 
comparison schools: 
(1) 
1 4
1 2
5 1
igst j stj j stj gt gt igt gt igt it gs igst
j j
Y R R S Oδ δ µ λ λ υ ε
−
=− =
   
′= + + + + + + +   
   
∑ ∑ β X . 
In this regression, Y is the post-test for student i in grade g, school s, and year t. The summation 
terms represent a set of “relative year” indicators R and coefficients δ  for each year from five 
years previous to a replacement to four years after a replacement. Whereas year t is a school year 
from 2005–2006 through 2011–2012, the index j represents a year relative to a replacement that 
may have occurred after any one of the 2007–2008 through 2010–2011 school years. The two 
summations exclude year j = 0 because our primary specification excludes the relative year 
indicator for year 0—the last school year the exiting principal led the school—so that the 
coefficients on the remaining indicators measure changes relative to achievement in exiting 
principals’ final year in DCPS.23 
The next term, gtµ , is a set of indicators for each grade-year combination to account for 
differences in achievement levels over time and across grades that arise because of which 
students are included in the analysis sample. The variables S and O represent the same- and 
opposite-subject pre-tests with associated coefficient vectors 1λ  and 2λ . We estimated a separate 
pre-test coefficient for each grade and year. The vector X includes the other individual student 
background characteristics and the coefficient vector βprovides relationships between each 
characteristic and achievement that are constrained to be the same in every grade and year. 
To account for characteristics of schools that do not change over time, including fixed 
differences between schools with new principals and comparison schools, we included indicators 
for each school-grade combination in gsυ .
24
 The error term ε  represents any other student-, 
school-, or year-specific factors.25 Finally, we weighted each record in the regression based on a 
                                                 
23
 We also estimated a version of regression (1) using propensity score weights to construct a comparison group that 
was more similar to the group of schools with replacements based on value added from the 2005–2006 and 2006–
2007 school years and demographics of students in the schools. Results from these matched specifications are 
reported in Appendix E. 
24
 Our main results treat combined schools as the same school when constructing fixed effects, but we also obtain 
similar results based on treating combined schools and pre-combined schools as distinct units. The latter approach 
implicitly excludes simultaneous transitions and school combinations from the group of schools with replacements. 
25
 We account for heteroskedasticity and correlation of regression errors within school-year combinations. We use 
the more conservative approach and account for clustering using a school variable that groups each combined school 
with its pre-combined school units rather than treating these as three distinct schools.  
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dosage variable that gives less weight to each record for students who attended multiple schools 
during the year.26 
                                                 
26
 In addition to the student-level regression approach in equation (1), as a sensitivity analysis we also estimated a 
school-level regression based on school value-added estimates as the outcome: 
4
5
gst j stj gt gs gst
j
V Rδ µ υ ε
=−
 
= + + + 
 
∑ . We assigned each record in this regression a weight based on the estimated 
standard errors of school value added to reduce the influence of imprecise value-added estimates. Specifically, we 
used the inverse of the squared standard error. Results based on this specification were similar to those from the 
student-level specification. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE VALUE-ADDED MODEL 
In this appendix, we provide a brief description of the school value-added model that we 
used for descriptive statistics in Section III and for our preliminary investigation of the impact of 
new principals in Section IV.A. We also used these estimates to conduct a sensitivity analysis 
described in Appendix A. The features of the approach are described in more detail in the 
description of the school value-added model in Isenberg and Hock (2012); some of the methods 
from that description have been updated as in the description of the teacher value-added model in 
Isenberg and Walsh (2014). 
We produced math and reading value-added estimates for each school-year-grade 
combination and then obtained a single math and reading estimate for each school-year 
combination by combining the estimates across grades. To do so, we estimated separate 
regression models in math and reading for each grade using data at the student-year level. Each 
regression related achievement on the post-test to achievement on the same- and opposite-subject 
pre-tests, other student background characteristics, and variables for each school-year 
combination. The pre-test relationships were allowed to vary for each grade-year combination, 
but we estimated one coefficient per grade (pooling across years) on each of the other student 
characteristics. For a student who attended a single school in a year, we assigned a 1 to the 
school-year variable for the student’s school in that year and a 0 to all other school-year 
variables. For students in multiple schools, we divided by the number of schools and then 
assigned a fractional amount of “dosage” to each school-year variable where the student attended 
and a 0 to all other school-year variables.27 We assigned dosage for students who attended 
schools that are not included in the analysis file to a catch-all school for the year. 
The coefficients on the school-year variables provided initial estimates of school value 
added in the grade and subject. We standardized the initial estimates so that the mean and 
standard deviation of the distribution of teacher estimates is the same across grades and then 
averaged the estimates across grades within each school-year combination.28 The resulting 
estimates are measured in standard deviations of student-level test scores. 
We ran the regressions in two stages to allow an errors-in-variables correction for 
measurement error in the pre-tests. As a measure of true student ability, standardized tests 
contain measurement error, causing standard regression techniques to produce estimates of 
teacher effectiveness with systematic error. By netting out the known amount of measurement 
                                                 
27
 Although we obtained data on time enrolled in each school, we chose not use them because they are not of equal 
quality across all the years in the panel. 
28
 We used an adjusted standard deviation that removes estimation error to reflect the dispersion of underlying 
teacher effectiveness. Using the unadjusted standard deviations to scale estimates for combining across grades could 
lead to over- or underweighting one or more grades when the extent of estimation error differs across grades. This is 
because doing so would result in estimates with the same amount of total dispersion—the true variability of teacher 
effectiveness and the estimation error combined—in each grade, but the amounts of true variability in each grade 
would not be equal. Instead, we scaled the estimates so that estimates of teacher effectiveness in each grade have the 
same true standard deviation, by spreading out the distribution of effectiveness in grades with relatively imprecise 
estimates. Estimates based more on estimates from imprecise grades will have larger standard errors; we account for 
these standard errors in the analysis. 
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error, the errors-in-variables correction eliminates this source of error (Buonaccorsi 2010). In 
applying the errors-in-variables approach, we used grade-specific reliability data available from 
the test publisher (for example, CTB/McGraw Hill 2008). Reliability data were not available for 
the SAT-9 test scores or for DC CAS scores from 2006; we instead used the average DC CAS 
reliability in the same grade from 2007 through 2012. 
Correcting for measurement error required a second regression step because of 
computational limitations with the measurement error-correction method related to producing 
measures of precision. After running the errors-in-variables regression, we used the measurement 
error-corrected values of the pre-test coefficients to calculate an adjusted post-test that nets out 
the contribution of the pre-tests. We estimated a second regression step that excluded the pre-test 
variables and replaced the post-test with the new adjusted post-test. This step was necessary to 
obtain standard errors that are consistent in the presence of both heteroskedasticity and clustering 
at the student level, because the regression includes multiple observations for the same student.29 
                                                 
29
 Because we accounted for the precision of the estimates in the analysis, we did not apply empirical Bayes 
shrinkage, as is often done for value-added estimates. Shrinkage is most important when the goal is to interpret 
individual value-added estimates, which is not a goal in our analysis. 
  
APPENDIX C 
IMPACT OF REPLACING PRINCIPALS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF PERAA 
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IMPACT OF REPLACING PRINCIPALS IN THE FIRST YEAR OF PERAA 
In addition to examining the impact of all replacements between the 2007–2008 and 2010–
2011 school years, we also examined the impact of only those replacements that occurred at the 
end of the first year of PERAA. To do this, we excluded the 22 schools with transitions in the 
2008–2009, 2009–2010, and 2010–2011 school years from the analysis, leaving the 32 schools 
with transitions that occurred at the end of the 2007–2008 school year. We compared outcomes 
in these schools to the same 22 comparison schools used in the full analysis.  
In addition to paying special interest to this single cohort of new principals because they 
represent the first replacements to occur following PERAA, we also examined them to 
investigate whether differences in impacts across cohorts could confound the timing of impacts 
that pool across the four cohorts of new principals. Because we did not observe outcomes four 
years after a change in school leadership for all schools with post-PERAA transitions, trends in 
the impact estimates that pool across the four cohorts may reflect differences in the impacts 
across cohorts of new principals rather than effects of additional time a new principal has in the 
school after a replacement. For example, the impact of new principals in the first year of PERAA 
may be larger than those in the later years if the first round of replacing principals removed the 
least effective of the group. If so, the year 4 impact could be larger than in years 1, 2, and 3 even 
if the additional year the new principal was at the school had no impact on outcomes.30 
Because of the smaller number of transitions, results based only on these schools are less 
precise. We found no significant impact on math achievement for this first cohort of new 
principals, although the impact estimates for the first through fourth years with the new principal 
range from 0.00 to 0.07 standard deviations and are similar to those based on all four cohorts 
(Figure C.1). The impact estimates in reading for the first through fourth years with the new 
principal are slightly larger than those based on all four cohorts; they range from 0.07 to 
0.12 and, like the full sample results, are statistically significant in the third and fourth year the 
new principals led schools (Figure C.2).  
Because the impact estimates for the first cohort of new principals are slightly larger than 
those for all four cohorts, the impact estimates for the fourth year with the new principal in 
Table IV.1 could overstate the impact that would be obtained if we had included outcomes from 
after the 2011–2012 school year that would allow us to measure the impact of the later cohorts of 
new principals four years after replacement.  
                                                 
30
 Differences in impacts between cohorts would affect the results in this way, but the results would not be similarly 
affected if there were only differences in the composition of the schools, such as different levels of achievement. 
Because the analysis includes school fixed effects, we account for differences in composition across schools.  
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Figure C.1. Impact of new principals in the 2008–2009 school year on math 
achievement by year relative to replacement 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Notes: The figure includes 54 schools, of which 32 had new principals in the 2008–2009 school year. The 
figure includes only schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 
2011–2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are 
treated as the same school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. 
Schools that closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their 
schools. Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the school-year level.  
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Figure C.2. Impact of new principals in the 2008–2009 school year on reading 
achievement by year relative to replacement 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Notes: The figure includes 54 schools, of which 32 had new principals in the 2008–2009 school year. The 
figure includes only schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 
2011–2012, but excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are 
treated as the same school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. 
Schools that closed prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their 
schools. Outcomes for the seven school years are DC CAS scores. 
 Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the school-year level. 
-
0.
3
-
0.
2
-
0.
1
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
Im
pa
ct
 
of
 
N
e
w
 
Pr
in
cip
al
s
(st
a
n
da
rd
 
de
via
tio
n
s 
o
f s
tu
de
n
t a
ch
ie
ve
m
e
n
t)
-2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
Years Before or After Replacement
Impact of new principals 95 percent confidence interval
  
APPENDIX D 
ACCOUNTING FOR A POSSIBLE PRE-TRANSITION DECLINE  
IMPACT OF REPLACING PRINCIPALS IN DC MATHEMATICA POLICY RESEARCH 
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ACCOUNTING FOR A POSSIBLE PRE-TRANSITION DECLINE 
Using pre-transition data, our analyses can address the possibility that some of the change in 
the gap between schools with and without new principals following the transition may have 
occurred even if the exiting principal had remained in the school (Miller 2013).  
It is possible for our difference-in-differences estimates to incorrectly attribute student 
achievement gains to a new principal. Similar to the hypothetical example in Figure II.1, we 
show hypothetical data in Figure D.1 to illustrate how this might occur. The hypothetical gap is 
the same in 2006 and 2007, becomes larger in 2008, and then returns to its previous level for 
2009 through 2012. Because we compare the gap in each year to the gap from the last year 
exiting principals’ led their schools—which is 2008 in this example—our difference-in-
differences impact estimates from Section IV would attribute the entire decline in the gap 
between 2008 and 2009 to the new principal. However, the gaps in 2009 through 2012 do not 
represent an improvement compared to the earlier gaps in 2006 and 2007.   
Figure D.1. Hypothetical achievement trends for schools with and without 
new principals in the 2008–2009 school year with pre-transition decline 
 
Source: Hypothetical data. 
In this case, we would not be able to distinguish between two possible explanations: (1) the 
original principal became worse over time, leading up to the replacement or (2) the original 
principal was “unlucky” to experience a temporary downward trend in performance that caused 
DCPS to remove the principal, but this trend is not related to the principal’s effectiveness. The 
second possibility might occur because achievement based on standardized tests includes some 
measurement error. Consequently, standardized test scores can fluctuate even in a school with no 
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actual changes in the skills of students over time. Under this explanation, the downward pre-
transition trend in performance is not due to the quality of the original principal and would have 
rebounded had the principal remained in the school. Unlike the first explanation, the post-
transition impacts should not be attributed to the new principal, since the exiting principal would 
have achieved the same result had he or she remained in the school.31 
Our panel of student achievement data allows us to investigate these patterns to understand 
whether post-transition impacts can be fully attributed to the impact of the new principal. We 
address this concern by comparing post-transition impacts to the baseline level of achievement 
from before a possible decline in achievement. Table D.1 contrasts the results based on using the 
last year exiting principals’ led their schools (year 0) as the baseline, as in our main analysis 
(Panel A), and the alternative approach that uses achievement from two to five years prior to the 
exiting principals’ last year in DCPS (Panel B). The results in the year 0 column of Panel B 
indicate that the gap in achievement between schools with and without new principals declined 
by 0.03 standard deviations in math and reading before the transition occurred. This decline is 
not statistically significant. As a consequence of this pre-transition decline in achievement from 
the baseline years, the post-transition impacts that account for the decline are smaller and lose 
statistical significance. 
These lower alternative impact estimates likely understate the true impact. The evidence of a 
pre-transition decline is based largely on positive gaps observed in two pre-transition years (the 
second and third year prior to the exiting principals’ last year), rather than a systematic trend 
downwards (Figures IV.3 and IV.4), as in the hypothetical example in Figure D.1. If, instead, we 
were to estimate the impact using achievement from three to five years prior to the exiting 
principals’ last year in DCPS, the impact estimates would have changed less from those in Panel 
A of Table D.1 and might even have increased. Indeed, when we include achievement from 
additional pre-transition years as we do in a sensitivity analysis in Appendix E, accounting for a 
pre-transition decline leads to results that are more similar to those that do not account for the 
possible pre-transition decline. However, we caution that the quality of test scores from these 
additional pre-transition years may not be as high as those from the later years.  
  
                                                 
31
 This is an example of what economists frequently call an “Ashenfelter Dip,” which referred originally to falsely 
attributing wage gains to a training program that may only have returned participants to the wage rate they would 
have obtained without the program. The apparent gains arose because workers who had experienced a dip in wages 
were the ones who chose to participate in the program (Ashenfelter 1978; Jacobson et al. 1993). 
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Table D.1. Impact of new principals with and without accounting for possible 
pre-transition decline in achievement 
 
Impact by year since replacement 
(standard deviations of student achievement) 
Subject Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Panel A: Not accounting for pre-transition decline (impact relative to exiting principals’ last year in DCPS) 
Math n.a. 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading n.a. 0.01 0.05 0.09* 0.10* 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel B: Accounting for pre-transition decline (impact relative to 2 to 5 years prior to exiting principals’ last year in 
DCPS) 
Math -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
Reading -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.06 0.07 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The tables include 76 schools, of which 54 had post-PERAA principal transitions. The table includes only 
schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–2012, but excludes 
18 schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same school before 
and after they combined, so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed prior to the 2011–
2012 school year are not included. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level.  
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
n.a. = not applicable 
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ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE IMPACT OF NEW PRINCIPALS 
In this appendix, we provide estimates of the impact of new principals based on (1) a nine-
year panel of schools instead of the seven-year panel used for the estimates in Section IV, 
(2) weights to make the schools with and without new principals in our analysis more similar, 
and (3) including schools that were identified by a report in USA Today as having incidences of 
cheating on assessments (USA Today 2011).  
1. Results based on a nine-year panel 
We excluded outcomes from the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 school years from our main 
analysis because our data on the SAT-9 scores from these years are incomplete. In the nine-year 
panel, we included scores from these years. Doing so could provide a more complete picture of 
how impacts evolved over time, including possible trends in pre-transition impacts. One main 
difference between the samples used in the seven- and nine-year panels is that the latter excludes 
grade 10 students because we did not observe a pre-test for these students in the 2003–2004 
school year. 
The results using the nine-year panel are presented in Figure E.1 for math and Figure E.2 for 
reading, and are similar to those based on the seven-year panel in Figures IV.3 and IV.4. Due to 
excluding grade 10, the magnitudes of the post-transition impact estimates are slightly larger 
than in the seven-year panel results. Only one of the pre-transition “impact” estimates is 
statistically significant; the impact from seven years prior to exiting principals’ last year in DCPS 
in math is significantly smaller than zero. As with our main results from the seven-year panel 
(shown in Panel A of Table E.1), these results are generally consistent with the key assumption 
of our analysis that outcomes for the two groups of schools would have progressed similarly in 
the absence of transitions. The post-transition impact estimates based on the nine-year panel are 
also shown in Panel B of Table E.1. 
Accounting for a possible pre-transition decline in achievement for schools with new 
principals has less impact when using the nine-year panel compared to the seven-year panel. The 
nine-year panel results in Panels A and B of Table E.2 that respectively do and do not account 
for the possible decline are very similar. Although these nine-year panel estimates do suggest 
that the seven-year panel estimates in Panel B of Table D.1 that account for a possible pre-
transition decline are too conservative, we caution that this conclusion is based on SAT-9 test 
score data that may be incomplete and lack the level of quality that may come with the additional 
scrutiny paid to the DC CAS scores by DCPS and other stakeholders. 
2. Results based on propensity score weights 
We also estimated impacts using propensity score weights to construct a comparison group 
that was more similar to the group of schools with new principals based on value added from the 
2005–2006 and 2006–2007 school years and demographics of students in the schools. Schools 
that kept the same principal that were more similar to those with new principals received more 
weight in the analysis and schools with new principals that were more similar to those that kept 
the same principal also received more weight. Results from these matched specifications are 
similar to our main results for reading, and smaller and not significant in math (Panel C of 
Table E.1). 
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3. Results based on including schools with potentially compromised test scores 
Finally, we estimated impacts that included 12 schools with new principals and 6 schools 
that kept the same principal that were identified in a USA Today report as showing evidence of 
cheating in at least half of tested classrooms in at least one of the 2007–2008, 2008–2009, or 
2009–2010 school years. Tests were flagged by the DC test score publisher if they had high rates 
of incorrect answers that were erased and replaced with correct answers (USA Today 2011). 
Although similar in magnitude to results that exclude these schools, including these schools leads 
to statistically significant impacts in math and reading two years after the replacements (Panel D 
of Table E.1). 
Figure E.1. Impact of post-PERAA new principals on math achievement by 
year relative to replacement, nine-year panel 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Notes: The figure includes 57 schools, of which 41 had post-PERAA new principals. The figure includes 
schools observed in each of the nine school years from 2003–2004 through 2011–2012, but 
excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same 
school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed 
prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their 
schools. Outcomes are SAT-9 scores for the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 school years and DC 
CAS scores for 2005–2006 through 2011–2012. 
 Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the school-year level.  
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Figure E.2. Impact of post-PERAA new principals on reading achievement by 
year relative to replacement, nine-year panel 
 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Notes: The figure includes 57 schools, of which 41 had post-PERAA new principals. The figure includes 
schools observed in each of the nine school years from 2003–2004 through 2011–2012, but 
excludes schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same 
school before and after they combined so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed 
prior to the 2011–2012 school year are not included. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their 
schools. Outcomes are SAT-9 scores for the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 school years and DC 
CAS scores for 2005–2006 through 2011–2012. 
 Confidence intervals are based on standard errors that are clustered at the school-year level.  
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Table E.1. Alternative estimates of the impact of new principals on math and 
reading achievement  
 
Impact by year since replacement 
(standard deviations of student achievement) 
Subject Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Panel A: Main results using the seven-year panel (54 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading 0.01 0.05 0.09* 0.10* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel B: Nine-year panel (41 schools with new principals, 16 comparison schools) 
Math 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.10* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Reading 0.04 0.06* 0.10* 0.15* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Panel C: Propensity score weights (54 schools with new principals, 22 comparison schools) 
Math 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading 0.02 0.05 0.09* 0.11* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Panel D: Including schools with possible cheating (66 schools with new principals, 28 comparison schools) 
Math 0.00 0.07* 0.06 0.07 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Reading 0.00 0.05* 0.07* 0.09* 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: Panel A includes schools observed in each of the seven school years from 2005–2006 through 2011–2012. 
Panel B includes schools observed in each of the nine school years from 2003–2004 through 2011–2012. 
Schools that combined are treated as the same school before and after they combined so they can be 
included in these samples. Schools where likely cheating occurred are excluded except in Panel D. 
 The propensity score specification places more weight on comparison schools that are more similar to 
those with new principals based on value added from the 2005–2006 and 2006–2007 school years and 
demographics of students in the schools. 
 Impacts are measured relative to outcomes in year zero, the last year exiting principals led their schools. 
Outcomes for the nine-year panel are SAT-9 scores for the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 school years and 
DC CAS scores for 2005–2006 through 2011–2012. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level. 
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
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Table E.2. Impact of new principals with and without accounting for possible 
pre-transition decline in achievement, nine-year panel 
 
Impact by year since replacement 
(standard deviations of student achievement) 
Subject Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 
Panel A: Not accounting for pre-transition decline (impact relative to exiting principals’ last year in DCPS) 
Math n.a. 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.10* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
Reading n.a. 0.04 0.06* 0.10* 0.15* 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Panel B: Accounting for pre-transition decline (impact relative to two to seven years prior to exiting principals’ last 
year in DCPS) 
Math -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.05 0.10 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Reading -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09* 0.14* 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Source: Mathematica calculations based on administrative data from DCPS and OSSE. 
Note: The tables include 57 schools, of which 41 had post-PERAA new principals. The table includes only 
schools observed in each of the nine school years from 2003–2004 through 2011–2012, but excludes 
schools where likely cheating occurred. Schools that combined are treated as the same school before and 
after they combined so they can be included in this sample. Schools that closed prior to the 2011–2012 
school year are not included. 
 Outcomes for are SAT-9 scores for the 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 school years and DC CAS scores for 
2005–2006 through 2011–2012. 
 Standard errors are clustered at the school-year level.  
* = statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
n.a. = not applicable 
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